

2016 MAR 16 PM 1:04

STATE OF WASHINGTON

BY 

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2/21/16 page (1) of (16)

In the Court of Appeals, State of Washington, Division II

State of Washington respondent vs Joseph M. Donnette-Sherman appellant	No: 47602-9II statement of Additional Grounds Motion to Reverse and Vacate Verdict and Sentence due to Statutory Ambiguity
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
Comes Now Joseph M. Donnette-Sherman PRO SE to ask that the Court of Appeals Reverse and Vacate the Sentence, Judgement, Verdict, and charges in this case due to Statutory Ambiguity.

1. the Charge: Count 1 - Assault in the Second Degree while Armed with a Deadly Weapon; 9A.36.021 (1) (c); 9.94A.825; 9.94A.533 (4); 9A.36.021(1)(c) - class B Felony; In that the Defendant, Joseph M. Donnette-Sherman, in the State of Washington, on or about Aug. 4, 2013 did Intentionally Assault Bruce A Bayles with a Deadly Weapon, to wit: a machete


Dated this 7th Day of August, 2013  
J. Andrew Toyne, WSBA # 22582  
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

11<sup>th</sup> 3<sup>rd</sup> 2016  
day of March, 2016

 3.12.16

Janetta E. Jackson  
Notary Public in and for  
the State of Washington  
Residing in Wella Walla,  
Washington. My commission  
expires April 1, 2017



## Statutory Ambiguity

2.9.16 9am

Count 1 of the charging document is ambiguous and does not accurately depict the law in Washington state. Washington state law does not explicitly define the term "machete" as a deadly weapon. It is a yard tool until proved otherwise.

In re Scott 173 Wn.2d 411, 271 P.3d 218 (2012)  
"charging documents can be consulted to determine whether a judgement and sentence is invalid on its face." [State v. Floyd 178 Wn. App. 314, 271 P.3d 1091 (2013)]  
"The charging documents alone establishes the constitutional infirmity of defendant's murder conviction, because a court may not use facially invalid convictions for any sentencing purpose."

"An accused has a constitutionally protected right to be informed of the criminal charge against him, so he will be able to prepare and mount a defense at trial."

[State v. Rucocenco, 163 Wn.2d 428, P.3d 1276 (2008)]

"Reversal for trial error is made from the determination that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect."

[State v. Vangerpen, 125 Wn.2d 782, 794, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995)]  
see 176 Wn.2d 58, 592, P.3d 715 (2012)]

"Supreme Court reviews instructional errors de novo."  
[State v. Sublett]

An instrument that is primarily used as a tool must be defined as such, until it is used in another way. (If we speculate as to the intent of the Washington State Legislature's NOT specifically defining an instrument as a deadly weapon, we surmise that its use as a tool most vigorously determines its nature. [see RCW 9A.04.025; RCW 9A.04.270; RCW 9A.04.110 (6)]

# "Statutory Ambiguity"

2-24-16 Sam

[S.v. Castillo-Murcia 2015]

"to resolve a statutory ambiguity, a court may apply principles of statutory construction, refer to the legislative history of the statute, or consider case law precedents"

[Reeve's 184 Wn. App. at 158]

"A statute is ambiguous if its plain language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation."

"if ~~the~~ legislative intent still cannot be determined we must interpret the ambiguous statute in favor of the defendant pursuant to the rule of lenity" (Id at 158-159.)

[S.v. Johnson 2014]

[S. v. Vangerpen 125 Wn. 2d 782, 787, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995)]

"The information is constitutionally sufficient only if all essential elements of a crime, statutory and nonstatutory, are included in the document."

[S.v. Zillgale 178 Wn. 2d 153, 158, 307 P. 3d 712 (2013)]

"An essential element is one whose specification is necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior charged"

"This essential elements rule exists "to apprise the accused of the charges against him and to allow the defendant to prepare a defense" [Vangerpen]

[S. v. Nong 169 Wn. 2d 220 n. 3, 237 P. 3d 250 (2010)]


"if the state fails to allege every essential element, then the information is insufficient and the charge must be dismissed without prejudice."

Ballistics Deadly Weapon (1. An instrument which is likely to or which will cause or produce death or great bodily harm when

→ used in a manner contemplated by its design and construction.

Barbourville ex rel. (2. Whether an unloaded firearm

is to be considered a deadly weapon depends ordinarily upon whether the manner in which it was used or attempted to be used, whether as a firearm or a bludgeon."



[Eastmond 1996]

JI no. 6 does not use the word "intentional" which is the gravamen of RCW 9A.36.021 assault in the second degree. By framing the definition of assault in this way takes the meaning out of context of the Law, thus creating an ambiguity wherein the jury could be misled into thinking the instruction is in a legal sense when it is not fully. By following with JI no. 7 it may be concluded that assault and intent are separate under the law. Further, in JI no. 10 leaves out the phrase "with unlawful force" which serves to separate self defense under the law.

JI no. 8 defines "deadly weapon" per RCW 9A.41.270 [9.95, 04.110] which was not cited in the charges or the verdict. And (6) ? JI no. 15, though showing the correctly worded definition from RCW 9A.44A.025 paragraph two, is couched in verbiage referring to the other definition thus misstating the law regarding sentencing enhancement. The prosecution appears to be attempting to define the term "machete" as a knife with a blade longer than three inches. "Machete" is not explicitly defined in this way under the laws of Washington State.

Specifically, the phrase "AND, from the manner in which it is used" is confused with "circumstances" in which it is used. "In this case, the yard tool was not used as a deadly weapon since there was no significant injury even though there could have been. That the jury might have been confused by the instructions thus emerges from "the read as a whole" point of view.

The WA Supreme Court disapproved of the Gamboa verdict (2007) "a weapon's potential for harm is alone insufficient for a deadly weapon finding," and the court reversed.

JI no. 10 reads like they are describing a sense of ill manner. Is this really what Felony Assault is about? Is blowing smoke (second hand smoke) an Assault 2 with a deadly weapon?

By omitting specific intent, an element of the crime of assault, from its jury instructions on assault, a trial court commits an error of constitutional magnitude [Eastmond 1996]

"The cumulative error doctrine applies only when several trial errors occurred which, standing alone, may not be sufficient to justify a reversal, but when combined together, may deny a defendant fair trial." [Hodges 2003]

J1 no. 6 omits the term "intentional". Although case law has indicated that "intent is an element of the offense which is inherent in the term assault," [Sve 2007] this may not be clear to the jury. By defining the crime of assault without its context in RCW 9A.36.021 where "intent" appears as part of the legal definition, the instruction confuses the definition. Also, J17 does not address the necessity for premeditation "more than a moment of time."

Chapter 2 (2005) 13th W. App. 657 (2004)

Then in J1 7 the "intent" appears to be not related to "Assault" (why is separate pages helpful?) And in J1 no 11(i) "intentionally" is again not included as it was in charging document count 1.

J1 no. 13 is supposed to be about self defense, but doesn't mention "self defense" thereby again confusing the issue for the non-legal person. no. 13 also does not include the phrase term "subjectively", thereby making self defense under the law of Washington state less "manifestly apparent" to the average juror. [Walden 1997] [Kyllo 2009]

conclusion

J1 no 1 (9) reads: "It is your duty to accept the law from my instructions, regardless of what you personally believe the law is or what you personally think it should be." (9) "the law is contained in my instructions to you." \* Any instructional ambiguity or misstatement therefore invalidates all of the instructions in this trial verdict.

vacate conviction

Deadly Weapon (DW)

count 1, Machete not yet found to be DW by Trial

3/2/16 9am

RCW 9A.04.116(6) requires more than mere possession <sup>display</sup> where the weapon in question is neither a firearm nor an explosive. In accordance with the plain meaning of this statute, unless a dangerous weapon falls within the narrow category for deadly weapons per se, its status rests on the manner in which it is used, or threatened to be used. no statements like [In re Pers. Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wn.2d 354, 256 P.3d 777, 2011 Wash. LEXIS 322 (wash 2011)]

stick - con ) P

S

\* compare P's statement at time of alleged assault with V.R.P re: what was said about warning verbal

[St. v. Gamboa, 137 Wn. App. 650; 154 P.3d 312; 2007 Wash. App. LEXIS 556 No. 24610-8-111 (2007)] "A machete was a deadly weapon because it was readily capable of causing great harm since there was ample evidence that the machete was accessible and available."

Supreme Court of WA

"Disapproved" by SC in re: Reversed by Supreme Court \* [Restraint of Martinez 171 Wn.2d 354; 256 P.3d 777; 2011 Wash LEXIS 322 No. 83219-6 (2011)]

"Wash. Rev. Code 9A.04.116(6) creates two categories of deadly weapons: deadly weapons per se, namely any explosive or loaded or unloaded firearm AND deadly weapons in fact." "A court, in construing a statute, must attempt to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent. When the language of the statute is unambiguous, the court discerns legislative intent from the language of the statute alone and will give effect to the plain meaning of that language."

Lorenson 1972, V.R.P Sentencing Hearing, page 6, line 13

[State v. Bashaw 2009, 2010] "Before state introduces evidence that will result in a mandatory penalty enhancement, the state must show that the evidence it relies on is accurate." Defendant informed the court that the machete used at trial by hearsay was NOT his yard tool prior to sentencing and as soon as possible given his jailing and being held incommunicado

# Definitions

Deadly Weapon Special verdict - Definition 9A.04  
RCW 9A.04A.825 SRA 1991 recodified .602 to 825 (2009)

In a criminal case wherein there has been a special allegation and evidence establishing that the accused or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime, the court shall make a finding of fact of whether or not the accused or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime, or if a jury trial has been had, the jury shall, if it finds the defendant guilty, also find a special verdict as to whether or not the defendant or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime.

For purposes of this section, a deadly weapon is an implement or instrument which has the capacity to inflict death AND from the manner in which it is used is likely to produce or may easily and readily produce death. The following instruments are included in the term deadly weapon: Blackjack, sling shot, billy club sand club, sand bag, metal knuckles, any dirk, dagger, pistol, revolver, or any firearm, any knife having a blade longer than 3 inches, any razor with an unguarded blade, any metal pipe or bar used or intended to be used as a club, any explosive, and any weapon containing poisonous or injurious gas. (NO knife < 3")

RCW 9A.04A.827-839 special allegations - of a particular kind (gangs, sex, minors, prostitution, drugs, cops) last edited (2015)

RCW 9A.05.015 Finding of Fact or Special Verdict Establishing Defendant armed with a deadly weapon.

\* 9A.04.110 (6) "Deadly Weapon" means any explosive or loaded or unloaded firearm, and shall include any other weapon, device, instrument, article, or substance, including a vehicle as defined in this section, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm.

More recent

different from Assault 2 these def. are revised and do not include weapons

to determine "Deadly weapon under law" where's the authority?

name "Machete"

Does Not

Some legal context Not a charging document

## False Evidence (FE)

2/28/16

9am

The actual machete used at trial was admitted as hearsay by Deputy Brooks' statements. [Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) page 62, line 3.] Note that the trial machete does not match the yard tool depicted in Photo exhibit no. 9 (10 or 8?) [VRP 88/6] wherein Defendant says he was struggling for balance [sentencing hearing VRP]. The trial machete appears more weapon-like than the thin, dull, light weight yard tool, thus prejudicing the Jury.

In re [State v. Mills (1995)] "court of Appeals was required to determine whether, as a matter of law, facts were sufficient to prove that defendant was armed for purposes of sentence enhancement statute."

In re [State v. Fowler (1990)] "Penalty can not be enhanced if evidence establishes that defendant was armed with a gun-like (machete-like) but non deadly weapon."

In re [State v. Sorenson (1972)] "the character of an implement as a deadly weapon is determined by its capacity to inflict death or injury AND its use as a deadly weapon by the surrounding circumstances, such as intent and present ability of the user, the degree of force, the part of the body to which it was applied, and the physical injuries inflicted."

Trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence (machete) not based on tenable grounds, and was hearsay, and was inflammatory and prejudicial because it was more "weapon-like" than Defendant's yard tool, and did not accurately portray the lack of injurious potential.  
? [State v. Stenson (1997)]?



not deadly per se (firearms) <sup>deadly by fact & proved by</sup> definitions  
Machete in case law takes a variety of definitions 2.28.16 8pm

Supreme [S v Myrick 1982] machete paraphernalia in Weed operation

[S v Lester 1968] compares with tools

Appeals [Cramer Prop Serv. v Song 1996] for use in a job description

[S v Rodriguez 1992] "a knife that looks like a Machete"

[S v Brooks 1978] used to dismember dead body

[S v Terry 2005] mixed question of law and fact

RCW 9A.04.110(2); 9A.04.110(6)

Indeterminate sentences → terms fixed by board - minimums for certain cases ~~not used~~

[State v Gamba 137 Wn. App. 850, 154 P.3d 312 (2007)]

"Standard for Deadly weapons" - Read the circumstances provision out of the statute and treated the machete as if it were a deadly weapon per se. [wa Supreme Court (2011)] <sup>Restraint of Martinez</sup>

[State v Schilling 77 Wn. App. 166, 169, 989 P.2d 948 (1995)]

broken bottle "not a deadly weapon per se." "Circumstances of use include the intent and present ability of the user, the degree of force, the part of the body to which it was applied and the physical injuries inflicted."

RCWA Definitions

RCW 9A.04.110(6) "DW means any explosive or loaded or unloaded firearm, and shall include any other weapon, device, instrument, article, or substance, including a vehicle as defined in this section, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm." Plaintiff's phone? lunging

RCW 9A.04.100 B1D(1) competent evidence or can't convict.  
(2) where there exists a RD as to which of two or more degrees he is guilty he shall be convicted only of the ~~lesser~~ lowest degree.

Competent Evidence

RCW 9A.16.020 Use of Force - When lawful

(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured... in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his person... in case the force is not more than necessary.

Not charged  
Misdemeanor only

RCW 9A.41.020 Weapons apparently capable of producing bodily harm

(1) Unlawful to carry, exhibit, display, or draw any firearm, dagger, sword, knife, or other cutting or stabbing instrument, club, or any other weapon capable of producing bodily harm, in a manner, under circumstances, and at a time or place that either manifests an intent to intimidate another or that warrants alarm for the safety of others.

SD

(3)(c) subsection (1) shall not apply to any person acting for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of ~~force~~ presently threatened unlawful force by another, or for the purpose of protecting another against the use of such ~~force~~ unlawful force by a third person.

# Self Defense (SD) in Jury Instructions

2.25.16 10 am

"The use of force upon or toward the person of another is lawful when..." [Jury Instruction no. 13] (3 #2)

This sentence is confusing because it attempts to simplify the Washington State Law with regard to self defense and becomes almost ~~non-sensical~~ nonsensical thereby.

None the less I will attempt to do so in my own terms:

to wit: In the state of Washington a person is entitled to use limited force to protect himself. Even if it is only his subjective perceptions that raise the need for self defense. (Unless his actions caused whatever the need was.) His subjective perceptions do NOT have to be proved, nor even real. The prosecution has the burden of disproving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the actor was using lawful force. - Joseph M. Donnell-Sherman

plaintiff's arguing

"Because non-deadly force was at issue, jury should have been informed that a person is entitled to act in self defense... only a subjective reasonable belief of imminent harm" was necessary.

[Ste v. Killo 2009]

Jury Instruction no. 13 in this case leaves out the word "subjectively" believes and thereby misstates the law. Particularly when combined with the prosecutor's statement during his closing argument; [VRP page 185, line 20-line 2] The prosecutor then goes on describing a hypothetical sequence of events that purportedly show a lack of any reason for self defense by the Defendant, which <sup>could be</sup> true. There was not yet any need for self defense and none occurred. There was not a situation of confrontation or combat until the Plaintiff lunged at Defendant as can be seen in photos 9 and 10. (Note photos have not been made part of the VRP at this point.)

Prior to the Total, the photographs from the Discovery had been reviewed by Defendant and OAC Attorney Larry Jefferson in his office. A video purported to be from Plaintiff's security camera

was also reviewed. The Defendant asked Mr Jefferson to provide an expert analyst to review the veracity of the video, and to confirm or deny Defendant's analysis of the photographs as illustrating Plaintiff's lunging motion. This request was not honored.

Ⓢ LJ's defense is SO, he should cover all the bases who is aggressor, speed of events, the law on personal property, the SO law in wa, better photo analysis why would assault? VRP 179/14 Assault by who? LJ confuses the Jury? = ineffective counsel

Jury can not infer intent from mere display of a dangerous weapon [state v. Macilee?]

Apprehension versus intent [state v. Bush (1942) James (1960)]

Accidental or intentional? [state v. Callahan (1991)]

Plaintiff's statement that he was holding his phone up to block an overhand blow occurred when in the sequence of photos? How did he get it high up from waist height?

Why didn't LJ cross examine about the mechanics of the moment of alleged striking, not to mention the mental state of aggression at that moment, how stable is the Plaintiff and does his demonstrated mental instability (VRP pg 84, line 14 - the crying episode) call his version of reality into question? Why wasn't Plaintiff evaluated for mental competence?

lexis headnotes: was

Aggressor Instr.

Wash. Super Crim R 3.3(b) trial date within 90 days  
Did LJ file notice of objection within 10 days of  
notice of Trial Date? Generally precludes Review Wash RAP P 2.5a

\*

St. v. Killo 141 Wa App. 1037, 2007 Wash. App. Lexis 3126 (2007) 32729-5-11  
& An aggressor instruction is appropriate even if there is  
conflicting evidence as to whether the DEF's conduct provoked  
the attack and thereby necessitated the use of force in SD.  
With conflicting evidence regarding the identity of the aggressor,  
an aggressor instruction is PARTICULARLY appropriate.

Standards of Review

"Under the Appearance of Fairness Doctrine..."

\*

"The cumulative error Doctrine applies when several Trial errors  
occurred but none alone warrants reversal, but the combined  
errors effectively denied the Appellant Defendant a fair trial."

[St. v. Hodges, 118 Wa. App. 668, 669, 71 P.3d 375 (2003)]  
[~~State v. Boman v City of Steawood~~]

[St. v Miller

with  
Trial

"In 1994 the Washington State Supreme Court Committee on Jury  
Instruction changed the instruction to state the law on  
apprehension of danger. Has there been time enough to  
trickle down?

what does WELC aggressor say?

# Self Defense

2-19-16 8am

9A.16.020 Use of Force - when lawful

(3) whenever used by a party about to be injured... in case the force is not more than necessary.

\* [W.Ct. App 2007] 1130, Wn. App. 191 156 P. 30 2007 Wash. Lexis 815  
Sv Woods 2007 } The legal standard applied to jury instr. is:

Jury instr. are sufficient if they are supported by substantial evidence, allow parties to argue their theories of the case and when read as a whole properly inform the jury of the applicable law. However, self defense instr. are subject to heightened appellate scrutiny. AJI must more than adequately convey the law of self defense in legal standard manifestly apparent to the average juror. Further a JI misstating the law of SD amounts to an error of constitutional magnitude and is presumed prejudicial.

Prudent Person  
reasonably

"Evidence of SD must be assessed from the standpoint of the reasonably prudent person, knowing all the DEF knows and seeing all the DEF sees. Courts must inform the Jury that the self defense STANDARD incorporates both objective and subjective: the subjective portion requires the jury to stand in the DEF's shoes and consider all the facts and circumstances known to the DEF, while the objective portion requires the Jury to determine what a reasonably prudent person would do.

\* Closing re: VRP  
look up VRP 19 186 line 1

"A jury may find on the basis of the DEF's subjective, reasonably belief of imminent harm from the victim..."

"A DEF is entitled to use force to defend himself if he reasonably believes... injury

manner used = non deadly so no DW

Prosecutor's closing is replete with facts or incorrect leading assumptions, the citation of which is onerous, to the extent to which it might be easier to list any truth at all. Tsk tsk, such imagination

IS - character witness

ineffective counsel

DW SE Englestad 2014

CASE LAW CITATIONS

290 Floyd 2013 Pro Se status 178 Wn. App. 316 P.3d 1091 Wash App. (2013)

~~no. 3~~ ~~sub~~ ~~enhance~~ ~~part of body~~ ~~aggressive~~ ~~conclusive~~ ~~instr.~~ ~~conclusive~~ ~~error~~ ~~Kyllo~~ 2010 2007 Wash. App. LEXIS 3101 no. 32129-5

Ruervo 2008  
Vangerpen 2012 125 Wn.2d; 888 P.2d 1177 (1995)  
Scott 2012 125 149 Wn. App. 213; 202 P.3d 985; 2009 Wash App. LEXIS 556 no. 34686-9-11

Sorenson 1972 6 Wn. App. 269; 492 P.2d 233, 1972 Wash. App. LEXIS 1165 no. 16041229-1  
Schilling 1995 4 Wn. 2d 105; 253 P.2d 952, 1953 Wash. LEXIS 419 no. 32172

Miller law change

Chavez 2008 unpublished juvenile  
Eastmond 1996 mere display 129 Wn. App. Wn.2d 497; 919 P.2d 577 LEXIS 413 no. 63252-9

Gonzales 2014 Wash. App. Lexis 1974 no 444-33-0-11

Villanova 2014  
Sorenson 1972 121 Wn.2d 447; 919 P.2d 577; 1996 Wash. App. LEXIS 413

Hong 2010

Reeve's 2014 184 Wn. App. 154; 336 P.3d 105; Lexis 2553 no. 44811-A-11

Johnson 2014 180 Wn.2d 295; 325 P.3d; 2014 Wash LEXI 341 NO 88683-1  
Zillyette 2013 178 Wn.2d 153; 158, 307 P.3d 712 (2013) essential element Court 1

Hutchinson 1998 135 Wn.2d 863; 959 P.2d 1061 656 656 656  
Walden 1997 131 Wn.2d 469; 932 P.2d 1237 Lexis 96 no. 63992-2

Kyllo 2009 166 Wn.2d 856; 215 P.3d 177 Lexis 743 no. 81164-4  
Maciolet stand in DET choes

Woods 2007 legit. Jury Instr. 138 Wn.2d App. 191; 156 P.3d 309; Lexis 816 no. 24910-7-11  
Walden 1997 100 Wn. App. 318; 997 P.2d 929 Lexis 69 no. 43944-0-1

Eckenrode 2007 nexus  
Pittle 1995 death penalty 118 Wn. App. 668; 77 P.3d 375; Lexis 2778 no. 2  
Hodges 2003 cum error 66 Wn.2d 273; 401 P.2d 971 no. 52901-2-1

badges 1965 actual danger vrs. subjective perception Lexis 857 no 37690

Bland 2005  
Walker 1985 80 40 Wn. App. 658; 700 P.2d 1168 Lexis 2426 no 7093-6-11

Stenson 1997  
Woods 2007 138 Wn. App. 191; 156 P.3d 309; 2007 Wash App. L816

Grigler 1979 wine shooting thru door  
Gambora 2007 137 Wn. App. 660; 154 P.3d 312 Lexis 556 no. 24610-8-11

Lawsen 2014

McCullum 1983 118 Wn.2d 484; 656 P.2d 1064 Lexis 1339 no. 47166-3  
McGage 2011 172 Wn.2d 802; 262 P.3d 1225 L813, no 85657-5

McGreven 2012 170 Wn. App. 444; 284 P.3d 793, L2068 no. 39538-3-11

Allen 1987 101 Wn.2d 355; 678 P.2d 1198; 1987 Lexis 1053 OVER  
Martinez 2011 171 Wn.2d at 360; 256 P.3d 277 Lexis 322 no. 83219-6

<sup>0. cap & intent</sup>  
Graveman Davis 1992

<sup>without</sup> Laport 1961

Appre Brower 1986

Wigley 1971

<sup>non deadly</sup> Fowler 1990

<sup>fault & intent</sup> Pam 1980

Diselay Macilec

Wasson 1989

<sup>disprove DW</sup> Acosta 1984 101 Wn.2d 612; 683 P.2d 1069 L1671 no. 49621-8

<sup>evidence</sup> Beadle 2011

<sup>premed</sup> Suggers 2014 caps

Gunter 1984

<sup>SE enhance</sup> Fowler 1990

<sup>or accurate</sup> Baskaw 2009-10 can't enhance with false evidence

<sup>statute sanctions</sup> Alvarez 1995

Hughes 1986

Davis 1992

<sup>accident or</sup> Fowler 1990 117 Wn.2d; 785 P.2d 808; 1990 Wash. LEXIS 810 56175-33

<sup>so</sup> Callahan 1991

<sup>premed</sup> Walker 1985

<sup>aggression</sup> Theret 1980

<sup>Apprehension</sup> Bush 1992

<sup>1st intent</sup> James 1960

Eastmond 1996 129 Wn.2d 497; 919 P.2d 577; 1996 Wash. LEXIS 413

Stenson 1997

Pirle 1995

Lane 1995

Powell 1995

Sue 2007 Wash. App. LEXIS 2350 No. 33015-6-II

[Chavez 2006 134 Wn. App. 65; 142 P.3d 1110 Wash. App. LEXIS 1849 No. 33240-0-11]

(Supreme Court of Wa. 163 Wn.2d 262; 180 P.3d 1250

2008 Wash LEXIS 262 No. 79260-8)

WCP CWJ chapter 38.02.3

RCW 9A.04.060 - Common Law to supplement statute



one sided

NO. 47602-9-II  
Court of Appeals, Division II  
March 8, 2016

pg(1) of (145)

State of Washington  
respondant


vs.  
Joseph M. Donnetta - Sherman  
appellant

Appeal from the Superior Court  
for Thurston County  
The Honorable Erik D. Price, Judge  
Cause No. 13-1-0173-9

Motion to Compel Discovery and Award Fees  
Approximate Date of First Requests 6/10/2015 (9 months)  
 $\pm 270 \text{ days} \times 100 \text{ \$/day} = \$27,000.00$  <sup>90</sup>

Thomas E Doyle WSBA 10634  
Attorney for Appellant  
PO Box 510  
Hansville, WA 98340  
(360) 626 0148

Signed:

 3.10.2016

Joseph M Donnetta-Sherman # 383022  
Washington State Penitentiary WA 14 U  
1313 N. 13th Ave  
Walla Walla, WA 99362

see attached  
Pg: I am in receipt of the court's decision to NOT order  
the requested documents and have included this motion  
to illustrate the delays I have been experiencing only

State of Washington  
respondent  
vrs

Joseph M Donnette-Sherman  
appellant

No. 47602-9-II

Motion for Reconsideration  
pursuant to RAP. 7.2(a)(3)

dated Feb. 2-17-16

Clerk Action Required

Comes now the Appellant Joseph M Donnette-Sherman prose  
hereby respectfully requests the court of Appeals to order  
Thurston County Jurisdiction to provide the Trial exhibits  
2-10 (photos), Police Reports, Forensic Evaluation,  
Photos originally provided by Defendant's Discovery, and  
all copies of all videos and Pre-sentencing Briefs.

1. See attached motion to supplement the Record at State  
Expense dated 2-19-16 (sic)

2. The prior Motion to Supplement the record dated 2-19-16 (sic)  
Response is NOT complete. Missing are the photographic  
exhibits 2-10 (as well as photos apparently not used at trial,  
to illustrate Prosecutorial Misconduct and/or Ineffective Defense  
Counsel.); Police Reports from the night of Arrest (Aug. 4 2013);  
Forensic Evaluation Reports used at Sentencing. And Plaintiff's  
security camera videotapes originally reviewed at the office of  
Assigned Counsel Attorney Larry Johnson's office about two  
weeks before Trial.

3. The descriptions in the Verbal Report of Proceedings (VRP)  
(Transcripts) are not sufficient because they seem to  
refer to photos NOT presented at Discovery.

4. The Arrest reports will be compared to testimony in the VRP.  
Please note that the Prosecutor may have re-written the  
Reports prior to the Probable cause Hearing and call

(4. cont.) and all copies are needed for Appellants, (SAG)

5. The video referred to in the VRP page 11, line 30 shows evidence inconsistent with the photographs, taken by Plaintiff, of the incident (alleged assault) and the video has been doctored and falsified, thus impugning Plaintiff.


6. Appellant is indigent and disabled/impaired per the Appeal Petition and needs assistance from the Appeals Court clerk (or other agency) to serve all interested parties of any motion or document, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP.) Rule 15 special Provisions Relating to the Rights of Indigent Party. Documents need to be copied and transmitted to supplement the Record at State Expense per RAP 10.4(c).

7. Appellant is having difficulties with the Department of Corrections (D.O.C.) Washington State Penitentiary (WSP) for access to legal materials (WRIC) (case documentations) and legal copies and mailings. This is an emergency situation in that the Court of Appeals Schedule needs to be complied with. Appellant asks for a Court Order compelling D.O.C. WSP to assist with reasonable accommodation for legal paperwork and etcetera.

### Conclusion

These additional Records and Accesses may reveal errors of Due Process in this case that should be made part of the Record for case number: 47602-9-II and Appellants Statement of Additional Grounds (SAG)

Respectfully Submitted the 17th day of February, 2016

signed: 

Joseph M. Donato - Sherman DOC NO 383022

WSP WA 114 U; 1313 N 13th Ave & Walla Walla WA 99362

In the Superior Court of  
Thurston County WA

Cause No. 13-1-01173-9

State of Washington  
Respondent

Motion to Supplement the  
Record at State Expense  
pursuant to RAP 10.4(c)

v.  
Joseph M. Donnette-Sherman  
Defendant

Noted for 2-19-16

Comes now the Defendant Joseph Donnette-Sherman  
hereby respectfully requests the Superior Court  
to order Thurston County Court Records to  
provide the Trial Transcripts (include Arrest  
Police Reports), Jury Instructions, and voir dire.

1. Introduction

(a) Background

1.) Mr Donnette-Sherman was convicted in Thurston  
County Superior Court of Assault in the Second  
Degree while armed with a deadly weapon.

RCW 9A.36.027(1)(c), 9.94A.825, 9.94A.533(4),  
9A.36.021(1)(c).

2. On 1-19-16 the Defendant's Direct Appeal  
was filed in Washington Court of Appeals Division II  
No. 47602-9-11.

## II. Statement of Facts

13-1-01173-9

1.) Mr. Donnette-Sherman wishes to enter a Statement of Additional Grounds for Review Brief Pursuant to R.A.P. 10.4(c)

2.) Mr. Donnette-Sherman has repeatedly requested Trial Transcripts from his Attorney, Thomas E. Doyle P.O. Box 510 Hansville, WA 98130 Phone Number (360) 626-0148

3.) Mr. Donnette-Sherman's 1 year collateral period ENDS 5-19-2016. Therefore he is requesting the court to provide him with Transcripts for his trial to include all evidence exhibits.

## III. Conclusion

1.) please for the above noted reasons [Grant this Motion] The Defendant Respectfully requests the court to Grant This Motion.

Respectfully submitted this 22 Day of January 2016

signed:

Donnette

Superior Court of the State of Washington  
For Thurston County

Gary R. Tabor, Judge  
Department No. 1  
Chris Wickham, Judge  
Department No. 2  
Anne Hirsch, Judge  
Department No. 3  
Carol Murphy, Judge  
Department No. 4



2000 Lakeridge Drive SW • Building No. Two • Olympia WA 98502  
Telephone (360) 786-5560 • Fax (360) 754-4060

Lisa L. Sutton, Judge  
Department No. 5  
James J. Dixon, Judge  
Department No. 6  
Christine Schaller, Judge  
Department No. 7  
Erik D. Price, Judge  
Department No. 8

July 15, 2015

Joseph Donnette Sherman  
Washington Corrections Center  
PO Box 900  
Shelton, WA 98584

Re: Public Records Request dated 6/29/15  
Paper Copy received from other agency 7/15/15  
Cause number 13-1-01173-9


Dear Mr. Sherman,

You filed a public records request, dated June 29, 2015. A copy of the request was delivered to me today. You ask primarily for records that are in the court file or evidence used at trial. This office does not maintain the court file or evidence; that is done by the Thurston County Clerk's Office. You also ask, however, for "trial transcripts." Through this letter, I am answering your request for trial transcripts.


This court is not subject to the Public Records Act, but it wants to be helpful to citizens who are interested in court proceedings and operations. Here, the information that you want is a transcript from a trial. Transcripts are created by court reporters in their role as independent contractors, not employees, of the court. State law provides that court reporters have a right to be paid for transcription services beyond the salary that the court pays them. (RCW 2.32.240.)

It appears that you are asking about a trial in Thurston County Superior Court Cause Number 13-1-01173-9. The trial began April 21, 2015 and it was reported by Sonya Wilcox. You can reach Ms. Wilcox to order the transcript at (360) 786-5569, or by writing her at the court's address. This letter resolves your request, which is now considered closed.

Sincerely,

  
Rebekah Zinn  
Public Record Officer

12



THURSTON COUNTY  
WASHINGTON  
SINCE 1852

LINDA MYHRE ENLOW  
COUNTY CLERK  
And Ex-Officio Clerk  
of Superior Court

Tawni I. Sharp  
Chief Deputy Clerk

June 18, 2015

Mr. Joseph M. Donnette-Sherman #383022  
Washington Correction Center R3 01 L  
PO Box 900  
Shelton, WA 98584

West's RCWA 42.17.010

Dear Mr. Sherman:

We are in receipt of your request for information relating to Case #13-1-01173-9 received by this office on June 10, 2015.

**Public Disclosure Request.** The application of the public records statute to judicial records was resolved by Nast v. Michaels, 107 Wn.2d 300 (1986). The Court held that the statute did not apply to judicial records (case files) held by the County Clerk. Disclosure of judicial records is governed by a limited common law right of access as determined by the court on a case-by-case basis.

We need you to specifically identify - in detail - the documents that you want out of your case file. The Thurston County Clerk's Office is not in possession of police reports, photos, videos, etc., as these types of documents need to be requested from the arresting law enforcement agency - not the Clerk's Office.

So, the process that needs to be followed is: ID the documents you want from your case file and send us the list. We will send you the cost of the requested case file documents. Then, send your payment and a self-addressed stamped envelope so that we can mail the documents back to you. We will need payment and a self-addressed envelope in order to process your request.

Hope this helps.

Sincerely,

LINDA MYHRE ENLOW  
Thurston County Clerk

Sandra Parker  
Ex. Asst. to Clerk



# THURSTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON  
SINCE 1852

JOHN D. SNAZA  
Sheriff

2000 Lakeridge Drive, SW • Olympia, Washington 98502-6045 • (360) 786-5500

---

July 14, 2015

Joseph Donnette Sherman  
Washington Corrections Center  
PO Box 900  
Shelton, WA 98584

Dear Mr. Donnette Sherman:

I received your request for records regarding your arrest (late August 2013), and your directive in your request to have the copies paid by CGK Consulting LLC. I contacted Kai Keller at CGK Consulting LLC and he indicated that he would not be paying for these records, so I have closed this request. Please feel free to request these records again when you make alternative payment arrangements.

Please feel free to contact me if you have questions, or I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

JOHN D. SNAZA, SHERIFF

Judith Leeson, Legal Assistant

c: PDR 1373






Director of the office of Assigned Counsel (Dary) A Redregues  
Thurston County WA  
926 24th Way SW  
OLYMPIA WA 98502

I have not yet received requested documents from my court assigned attorney, Larry Jefferson, regarding my case number 13-1-01173-9. Mr Jefferson indicated he would provide me with copies of Arrest Reports and Photos from the night of my arrest (± Aug 4, 2013). Also, he was to provide me with the security camera video tape that we reviewed at his office a week or two before trial (April 21, 2015). Also, I requested the Jury instructions from my trial and the Competency Report used to determine my competency in stand trial.

Further Mr. Jefferson agreed he would compare the Machete used as evidence at my trial with the Photos of the one taken as evidence on the night of my arrest. His statement in this regard is needed.

These Documents are needed for a Pending Civil case (15-2-00844-4) and the delay may be causing me Harm.

Respectfully,



Joseph M. Donnette-Sherman #383022

WILLIAMS UNIT WA 130-L

Washington State Penitentiary

PO Box 520

1313 N 13th

Walla Walla, WA 99362

73-1-01173-9

6/29/15

page 2 of 2

- 6.) Indigent Report as filed by OAC. Attorney LARRY JEFFERSON (April 2015<sup>±</sup>)
- 7.) Court Response to Collateral Attack submitted by Plaintiff (± MAY 2015)

COPY FEES WILL BE PAID BY PLAINTIFF'S  
REPRESENTATIVE CBK CONSULTING, LLC  
2647 Westwood Drive NW SUITE 2  
OLYMPIA WA 98502  
(415) 747 2615  
ATTN: KAL KELLER

Please take note that this is my 2<sup>nd</sup> request as my first request was filed on the wrong form and legal authority.

Ten-day legal notice given this 29<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2015.

*Joseph M. Donnetto-Sherman*

Joseph M. Donnetto-Sherman #383022

Washington Corrections Center

Po Box 900

Shelton, WA 98584

REQUEST FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE RECORDS

To: Thurston County Superior Court

2000 Lakemidge Drive SW

OLYMPIA WA 98502

ATTN: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OFFICER

REQUESTER: Joseph M. Donnell Sherman  
Washington Corrections Center  
PO Box 900

Shelton WA 98584

RE: 13-1-01173-9

Ten day legal notice given on this ~~June 9~~<sup>9th</sup> day of ~~June~~<sup>June</sup> 20 15

DESCRIPTION OF RECORDS REQUESTED AND AUTHORITY

I, Joseph M. Donnell Sherman am requesting disclosure pursuant to RCW 42.56 et.seq. on the following listed documents.

- ✓ 1. Trial Transcript (including Evidence items/photos)
- ✓ 2. Sentencing Hearing Transcript
- ✓ 3. Jury Instructions
- 4. Appeal Documents
- 5. Arrest Reports (late August 2013)
- 6. Photos from night of arrest
- 7. Video as supra'd (in September or October 2013)  
(and viewed at OAC Attorney Larry Jefferson's office in April 2015)
- 8. Court Response from collateral Attack (4 May 20th 2015)
- 9. Pre Sentencing Briefs

All copying (for fees) is to be done only upon written request and from an itemized list prepared AFTER REVIEW OF RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS. No payments / duty will be owed for any copies produced not so authorized by me after review of requested records is completed.

Fees for photocopying is set under RCW 42.56, maximum rate of 20 cents per copy with no other fees or charges permitted or allowed by law.

Failure to respond or properly comply with disclosure is set out in RCW 42.56 and may result in penalties between five dollars and one hundred per day. Legal costs and attorney fees are also authorized pursuant to RCW 42.56 by State Legislature.

6/29/15

Thurston Superior Court  
2000 Lakeridge Drive SW  
Olympia WA 98502

13-1-01173-9

page 1 of 2

RE: DOCUMENTS REQUESTED FROM CASE FILE  
13-1-01173-9

REQUESTER: Joseph Donette Sherman (Plaintiff)  
Washington Corrections Center  
PO Box 900  
Shelton WA 98584

DESCRIPTION OF RECORDS REQUESTED:

1 Joseph Donette Sherman am requesting disclosure pursuant to the limited common law Right of Access as determined by the court on a case by case basis.

- 1.) Trial Transcripts including photograph evidence used at trial and statements by attorneys and Parties
- 2.) Sentencing Hearing Transcript including statements by parties and lawyers, and lawyers' briefs.
- 3.) Jury Instructions including revisions by Attorneys accepted by the Court.
- 4.) Appeal Documents filed by Larry Jefferson O.A.C. Attorney of record.
- 5.) Video Tape as exhibited by plaintiff (in September or October 2013±) and as reviewed in O.A.C. Attorney Larry Jefferson's office (April 2015±)

Superior Court of Washington for Thurston County  
2000 Lakeridge Drive SW Building Two  
Olympia WA 98502

RE: NO. 15-2-00844-4 CIVIL MOTIONS  
Hearing for Summary Judgment / Dismissal

Judge Mary Sue Wilson

I will NOT be able to attend the hearing set  
for July 10, 2015 because I am in prison at  
WCC / Shelton PO Box 900 SHELTON, WA, 98584

I have a consultant: CGK Consulting, inc  
2647 Westwood Dr NW Suite 2  
OLYMPIA WA 98502  
ATTN: KAL KEUER.


who ~~may~~<sup>may</sup> be able to communicate for me. I am unable  
to shop for an attorney from prison.

My initial response to the complaint by BA Bayles  
was filed with clerk Linda Myh...low on  
May 20, 2015.

The criminal case NO: 13-1-01173-9 is being  
under Appealed.

I ask that the hearing be postponed until such  
time as I can respond in person.

Joseph M. Donnell Sherman  
363022 R3 DIL  
WCC / Shelton POB 900 98584



CONTACTS

CASE NO. 47602-9-II ; TCSC13-1-01173-9

Washington State Court of Appeals, Division Two  
950 Broadway, Suite 300  
Tacoma WA 98402-4454 (253) 593 2970  
David C. Ponzona, court clerk

Linda Myhre Enlow  
Thurston County Clerk  
2800 Lakerridge Drive SW  
OLYMPIA WA 98502 (360) 786-5430

Thurston County Sheriff's office  
2000 Lakerridge Drive SW  
OLYMPIA WA 98502 (360) 786-5500  
Judith Leeson, Legal Assistant

Thurston County Office of Assigned Counsel  
926 24th Way SW  
Olympia WA 98502 (360)  
Daryl A. Rodrigues, Director  
Larry Jefferson, Attorney; case no. 13-1-01173-9

Superior Court of the State of Washington, for Thurston County  
2000 Lakerridge Drive SW; Bldg 2  
OLYMPIA WA 98502 (360) 786-5560  
Rebekah Zinn, Public Record officer

Thomas E. Doyle, Attorney at Law no. 47602-9-II  
PO Box 510  
Hansville WA 98340-0510 (360) 626-0148

Joseph M. Donnette-Sherman Doc no. 383022  
Washington State Penitentiary WA 114 U  
1313 N 13th Ave  
Walla Walla WA 99362

Court of Appeals, WA, DVI 47602-9-II COVER  
Statement of Additional Grounds 2/27/16 30 pgs

This treatise of a case gone awry  
By way of subtle and not-so-subtle manipulations  
at-trial gaming  
get out to prejudice legal thinking  
In a Marginal case under the law  
There are serious issues of statute clarity in WA Law Land  
that should have been directly addressed  
and carefully explained to the Jury, were they? (say No)

RCW 9A.36.021 Assault in the Second Degree

(1)(c) "Assaults another with a deadly weapon."  
Office of Assigned Counsel Attorney Larry Jefferson (OACLT) (LJ)  
Joseph M. Donohue-Sherman Defendant (DEF)

OACLT's statement: "what this case boils down to  
is whether you think a person  
has a right to self Defense  
while standing <sup>on</sup> victim's front walkway"

The complex issues in this case involve the meanings of;

intent act  
what is an "assault," "subjective state of mind" HA eval  
what do we mean by "intent," apprehension, and "diminished capacity"  
what constitutes a "deadly weapon," bodily harm RCW 9A.36.025  
when is Self Defense a Lawful Act?  
who was the instigator or participant, aggression  
where did the event take place (circumstances)  
why are we trying this case, burden of proof, or disprove  
prosecutorial misconduct, Jury Instructions, and BRD,

The facts as recorded by the Defendant (DEF) Affidavit

## NOTES ON CASE

2.13.16 9pm

There were two photos given to me at Discovery. These photos illustrate my version of events. They show myself holding up my yard tool. One photo I am out of machete range. The next the distance of the camera has been closed and the image blurred by the motion of the camera, thus illustrating BAB's lunging motion. From what I can tell, these photos were not presented to the jury with this explanation as I discussed with one Defence Attorney Larry Jefferson. I can only surmise that they were not used by the prosecution because they were not favorable to Plaintiff. This is only one example of a series of conditions that prejudiced the jury in this trial.

I have learned a great deal about the law and the criminal justice system. What I see is that the law, while fair, is confusing with regard to Assault, Deadly Weapons, Self Defense, and Sentencing. And the management of a trial and Jury deliberation is critical. I find myself having difficulty understanding issues of Ineffective Defense Counsel, Prosecutorial Misconduct and the subtle yet significant manipulation of this jury trial. The definitions of legal terms have been confounded. The Jury was manipulated psychologically.

I have also seen that criminal charges can be sewn with inaccurate and malicious intent. The Trial is more of a game of conviction-potential rather than a pursuit of the truth. To coin a phrase, "there is something rotten in Denmark." And I thank the state for the use of the D.O.C. Legal Library.

The photos noted above also were not selected for the Defense by Larry Jefferson. His comments to me most likely illustrate why. One of his first statements to me was "They are going to convict you. Is he simply presagent or does he know something about the impending legal process that subtly sets the stage for the prosecution's



2/14/16 Jam

Method of operation? Why else might a court appointed Defense Counsel talk to the Defendant in this way?

Mr Jefferson began our interviews with an "offer" by the State for a "plea bargain" to which I was supposed to confess to, They would "drop" the "deadly weapon" enhancement. As will be seen below, this will be used to land me in Prison. Little did I know at the time. There was not even an attempt to understand my assessment of the facts surrounding the accusations, which I was anxious to reveal and which should have exonerated me. If only I could get the powers that be to listen to me.

"This photo alone is enough to convict you" he said. Holding up like a mark of smite the photo of me having been captured while trying to regain my balance after falling. And holding my yard tool in some semblance of a weapon-like threat. Offensively, This disabled and arthritic old man who has lived peacefully among these neighbors for 23 years, in the quiet neighborhood of Westwood, where no one had ever seen a "machele attack." And still hasn't I might add after researching what such an attack might look like. It wouldn't involve approaching a would-be victim with belly exposed and hands raised into the air. From 23 feet away we are supposed to be intimidated? A machele is not an implement that can be thrown like a bullet. And this particular yard tool is thin, light weight, and not sharp like a knife. It is more of a toy version of the species. There by coincidence only after being used to trim the blackberry undergrowth. But the Plaintiff is supposedly apprehensive and in fear? But what does he do? Lunges toward it in an effort to get a closeup of my bellybutton. Thus putting himself in "harm's way". And after not being struck admonishes: "Go ahead, do it." As though he had not been presented with evidentiary culpability, sufficiently. And while restraining me with both his hands clasped on my left hand which was trying to hand his phone back.

2/14/16 9 am

Thus setting the stage for the next charge of Assault on the second degree. There go I, holding the yard tool back and away somewhat like holding a dog toy away before throwing it on a dog run. I didn't throw it. His eager eyes and aggressive tone looking somehow disappointed.

But the pictures were on his phone. Along with some other ones I have not seen. Not delivered to me at Discovery. Something about moving toward him with the dog's leash still in hand. After freeing it from its catch under the corner of the concrete walkway, but before the phone was picked up off the ground, why were these photos not presented to Defendant at Discovery? And why was Plaintiff's camera not taken into evidence by Deputy Brooks? So Plaintiff would not be inconvenienced, he said. After all, they had the photos to substitute.

And what of Plaintiff's security camera videotape. The one that, according to Plaintiff's statement he didn't know how to use so he would deliver it later. And Deputy Brooks agreed this would be acceptable. The same videotape that was not presented to Defendant at Discovery. The same video that was sequestered by the Defense and finally delivered to the Defense Attorney 2 weeks before trial. With the explanation that it doesn't play from the compact disk. Even if the Defense Attorney had agreed to get an expert analyst as Defendant requested, there would have been another trial delay. After all, the previous 18 months of delays prior to trial were more than enough if only the Defense had had the video available. The same video tape that was falsified according to Defendant, because it didn't show Defendant's fall. (It had been edited out) Nor did it show the shadows around the motions of the characters in the scene.

Meanwhile Deputy Brooks assists Plaintiff with making and filing his statement. And arrests Defendant (who had already claimed self defense) and handed him to the

2/14/16 9 am

29 years from nothing

Thurston County Jailers, where the Accused was held incommunicado, thus preventing him from defending himself and filing complaints of his own. Is this a common modus operandus in this county? Is this in spite of the accused requests for necessary prescription medications, medical assistance, and help with the dysfunctional phone system (Beyond this Disabled person's ability to make function). Beyond this county taxpayer's comprehension. Where were my services when I needed them?

webster's

But let us get back to legal and common definitions of terms, what are the definitions of Assault? Well, there is what we all commonly mean by it, which is "a violent attack." And then there are various legal definitions we are supposed to accommodate. In common law (the basis of our legal system) we find assault to be about attacking someone physically, fair enough and simple to understand. And then we see Definitions in the law of Washington State with its various interpretations in case law, and as approximated in the Jury Instructions in this case. To wit: [RCW 9A.36.011 Assault in the First Degree] having to do with "Intent" and "great bodily harm" which was NOT selected for the charges in this case, as such [RCW 9A.36.021 Assault in the Second Degree] where the definition appears in terms of itself after excluding Assault in the First Degree. And we find clause (c) "Assaults another with a deadly weapon." Does this mean that the term "Assaults" herein does not mean having to do with intent and bodily injury? or does it mean by virtue of its appearance last in the list, is something less serious than. Except that the "deadly weapon" appears apparently making it seem onerous, I don't know. But now we read other definitions in a different context wherein Assault means just the intention to harm, and eventually somebody can say their subjective feeling is violated. Such as listed in this case's Jury Instruction no. 10, which

2.4.16 10am

gets out three variations to choose from. All of which seem to have been edited to exclude "unlawful force" term which presumably related to a constitutional right to self defense in Washington State Law; which is the defense posture in this case. And which seems to appear in Jury Instruction no. 13 even though it does not mention self-Defense explicitly. In no. 10 we are introduced to "intentional touching" which is offensive; intent to inflict (even though not inflicted); and in the third paragraph "intent to create apprehension."

Was the jury somewhat confused by all this when they apparently found defendant guilty of (to paraphrase) intentionally offending without actually intending to? And all because I "could have" and my neighbor "might have" been apprehensive? So Defendant is branded a felon for life by a trial in which the honorable judge says "the law is contained in my instructions", the prosecutor contends (per Appeal Attorney Thomas Doyle) that there is no evidence outside statements made even though none is required for a self defense position? Meanwhile the Defense Attorney gesticulates in the background and probably never intended to object when the chicken was struggling to cross the road. \* what I'd like to understand is: who got that road in front of that chicken? And why is the sentence so excessive? Who in our society is this corner of law supposed to be protecting?

Why was this incident even brought to trial? Let's look and what the law says the prosecutors are supposed to consider in doing so, and the prevalent criticisms of their methods.

# July 10th Dire pg 40 line 21

There are books in the Department of Correction's Law Library about WA Criminal Practice and Prosecutorial Misconduct (WA Criminal Practice in Courts of Limited Jurisdiction)

"No Defendant may be convicted of a crime unless the statute allegedly violated gives clear... notice that the Defendant's conduct is prohibited," who knew? That the law rests on whether or not Self Defense might offend the other party. Or does it? Is the law dependant on the interpretations given it? Isn't it the appropriate discretion of enforcement authorities that is at issue here? Does this case hinge on confounded interpretations of the law?

In the book Prosecutorial Misconduct (ISBN: 978-1-4424-2213-7) chapter One says the following:

"There are limitations on the Prosecutor's charging decision, and some examples of these constraints are: The use of the criminal process for essentially civil purposes; Vindictive or Retaliatory prosecution; and discriminatory or selective prosecution."

When considering this case in this light, several issues come to mind. Is there significant harm when one party is arrested and charged, and the other isn't? Thus pitting a self-defense Defendant up against an aggressive Plaintiff, which of the parties should assume which posture and which burden? Once self defense is claimed, the likely trial position can be anticipated by the prosecutor who should know that he will bear the "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt" (BRD) burden of dis-proving self-defense which is very difficult barring some kind of confession. Barring a prejudiced jury. And barring a competent Defendant.

And we see here that the Prosecutor found it necessary to rewrite the arrest report and ensnare Defendant in Jail to prevent him defending himself in a legal manner. In a similar vein to refer to the Plaintiff as "the victim" thus pre-identifying the opposing parties with prejudice. Subtle but effective. Then repeatedly summoning Defendant

2:15:16 9am

over an eighteen month period of marginal delays. Is this to exhaust the Defendant and create an impression of inevitability by one way or another? We see here also that the charges had been inflated beyond the Misdemeanor level, and then offer a plea deal surrendering the deadly weapon enhancement and felony impeachment. Hmmm, when would you become weary and seek to settle by confessing to something you didn't do? Just to get past. All the while knowing your opponent is suing for damages where you might look more culpable.

Surely there was a less onerous charge of lesser degree that would have sufficed. And allow that level to be put before a jury. In the interest of fairness, Fairness by including a jury instruction for lesser degree (like maybe the level of the reducing pleas). Something the Office of Assigned Counsel (OAC) Defense Attorney failed to do in this case.

What was the extent of harm in this case that merited all this prosecution? Has not the Defendant suffered more harm than the Plaintiff? Assuming this conviction as a felon will be carried his whole life unless this Appeal overturns it. And what of the costs to the State to bag this barnyard squabble?

Let's think about that for a moment. Did the Prosecution understand that Defendant's defense fund would exhaust? And was it coincidental that his house is to be put up to foreclosure around the same time he goes to trial and prison? Thus compounding his adversity? Why was this case brought to trial? Ruining a life in exchange for a nicked finger, alleged apprehension, and sobbing during testimony (18 months later). The fear of a deadly weapon is only relevant at the moment of conflict, by the way.

[\*]

Does the crime really fit the punishment as the WA Sentencing Reform Act is wont to do?

2.15.16 10am

With regard to sentencing and enhancement we should address the relatively new mandatory sentencing regimen put in place in 1986 and subsequently modified by the state legislature as part of a greater legal reform sentiment. Nationally, here we find the revised (from common law) definitions of some key legal terms that ultimately have me writing this from prison. (By hand since the D.O.C. won't allow me the use of a word processor [my pet peeve]) "I'm getting blisters on my fingers."

What is a Deadly Weapon Enhancement and more to the point, when is it an appropriate tool of the Law. Is it likely to make me more reticent to carry yard tools around? Probably so at this point. But I don't think the community will be more safe in my case since I didn't use it in the manner to which it "could" be put to use. But what finding my yard tool in this light has resulted in, has me being in prison for 19 months; another 19 months of community custody, and 10 years to worry about a no-contact order. Plus all the economic hardships for this disabled American who can't work, nor walk effectively for more than a few blocks. Why? Because of the legal definitions of "violent offense," "assault 2," "deadly weapon," and "first time offender waiver" which conflagrate in this case.

2. Due Process Issues

11/23/16 (1)

1. Arrest process puts <sup>Def.</sup> Me at disadvantage
2. evidence, enhancement based on hearsay → First time
3. Ambiguous Law definitions (V. state) (subjective)
4. Self Defense burden of Proof and review of entire record
5. Evaluation of speedy trial
6. Ineffective Counsel
7. Prosecutorial Misconduct.

3. Medical Issues

1. photo interpretations, evidence withheld
2. Arrest reports
3. Sufficiency of evidence, corroboration of subjective
4. subjective state of mind of jury with BIG MACHETE
5. Actual events.

To begin with JDS was recovering from head trauma prior to and during the events of August 4, 2013. His physical symptoms included disturbed equilibrium and frequent incidents of spasmodic falling and retching, resulting from too vigorous too head motion. This is pertinent because of Defendant's (Def.) fall during the alleged assault whereby he momentarily struggled with his balance. Defendant's condition was observed by witnesses who were not called by Thurston County's office of Assigned Counsel (OAC) Larry Jefferson.

Brief Affidavit to corroborate this statement

→ The actual sequence of events of the event in question are as follows; and are illustrated in part by the Plaintiff's photographic evidence. The situation began with (Def.) working



12/3/16

in his yard immediately adjacent to Plaintiff's. Defendant was cutting blackberry vines with a yard tool. Because the vine originated under another bush the chosen yard tool was a light-weight "toy" machete long enough to reach under and next to the undergrowth.

At some point the Plaintiff's dog cried out as though injured (yelped). Upon inspection it appeared that the dog's long wire cable (leash) had become snagged under the corner of Plaintiff's front walkway. Suspecting this might be dangerous, as the dog might choke upon the concrete stairway, Defendant moved to free up the wire, his yard tool still in his right hand by coincidence, the wire was tangled in a knot which Defendant picked up with his left hand. The wire snag came free and the dog (who was about six feet away) began moving toward Plaintiff's front porch. The wire tangle briefly chinked on Defendant's left hand and pulled him over on to his backside. Defendant was not aware of Plaintiff's presence while struggling to free himself, but heard a vocalization. He raised his arms by way of a balancing gesture while turning and stepping up a step. Defendant commonly raises his arms to unweight

1.23.16

3

himself to accommodate his physical limitations from old injuries. Since his arms were already raised up, they became more raised at the moment that Plaintiff began his photography; apparently, subsequently Plaintiff lunged at Defendant (while taking another photo, blurred by the motion of the camera, and aimed from three feet away at Defendant's midsection). Note: this second photo was made

\*  
need trial documents

available to the Defense but may not appear in the trial record even though discussed to be part of Defendant's Defense with O.A.C. attorney Larry Jefferson.

Defendant moved his hands to protect his midsection reflexively. Some sort of accidental contact ensued which resulted in Plaintiff's phone/camera falling at Defendant's feet. As Defendant reached to pick it up for Plaintiff, Plaintiff grabbed Defendant's left hand with both hands and wouldn't let go even as Defendant tried to withdraw. Defendant's right hand was holding his yard tool out of the way somewhat like when a dog vies for a toy to be thrown at a dog park. Plaintiff then said "Go ahead do it," which Defendant took to be an odd request. is Plaintiff mentally disturbed prior to the alleged assault?

Defendant then yanked his hand away and left the scene to call 911 because of Plaintiff's aggressive behavior. All of this occurred within the space of some number of seconds which left no time for intent. Retrospectively, Plaintiff had

is Plaintiff mentally disturbed prior to the alleged assault?

completely exposed himself but no machete action ensued, nor did Defendant have any intent to do so.

We will look at the legal definitions of "Assault" and "Deadly Weapon" below but for now please understand that Defendant was suffering mental problems that limited his memory of his arrest, jailing, and lack of treatment for his trauma. Defendant's witness has reminded him of his arrest whereby the Prosecution's Deputies arrested Defendant but not the Plaintiff despite Defendant's claim of Self Defense.

The above noted situation was communicated to OAC, Attorney Larry Jefferson but may not have been presented to the jury. Defendant is claiming ineffective counsel and needs copies of Larry Jefferson's work notes including written statements submitted by Defendant, medical transcripts, all copies of all photos and security camera videotapes, pretrial court visits, all evaluations, and all reports of meetings with Prosecutorial and other State representatives concerning this case no. 13-01173-9 at Thurston County Superior Court.

Conditions ensuing Defendant's arrest effectively prevented him from acting in his own Defense with regard to any legal actions. He was effectively and essentially held incommunicado by the Prosecutorial Agents of the Thurston County Jurisdiction. When eventually asked why Plaintiff's charges were moved forward while Defendant's were not, it was purportedly since Plaintiff filed a complaint. When was Defendant supposed to file a complaint?

Why indeed was Defendant arrested in the first place? Defendant had indicated his self-defense and cooperated with County Deputies. Defendant was not read his Miranda Rights. He experienced an unwarranted search and seizure of his abode and property even though not made aware of his imminent arrest. Defendant's

1-23-16

yard tool was later used for sentence enhancement for a Deadly Weapon without acquiescence or any kind of proof that it was used as a deadly weapon. Its use by Thurston County Prosecution is therefore per evidentiary and hearsay rules only allowed as an example of Defendant's yard tool and not as evidence to be used for sentence enhancement.

A statement was made by one Attorney Larry Jefferson to the effect that Plaintiff's photograph of Defendant raising up his arms and yard tool was "alone enough to convict." How so? Defendant is shown 20 feet away and NOT contacting Plaintiff. That this amounts to some kind of intimidation can only be surmized, and is NOT a fact in the case. In Plaintiff's next photo the Defendant is still with arms up despite Plaintiff's closing of the distance, if this gesture is one of intimidation, why did Plaintiff approach? In any case Defendant's yard tool is NOT being used as a Deadly Weapon" per se, And LJ should have made this point.

The legal definition of Deadly Weapon appears via several statutes and case law determinations. First we have Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 9.94A.825 Deadly Weapon Special Verdict (second paragraph): "For purposes of this section, a deadly weapon is an implement or instrument which has the capacity to inflict death AND from the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce death." Standing with arms raised is unlikely to result in death.

Plaintiff's photos could be interpreted as brandishing (if that, given the context) but that is NOT a Felony under the laws of Washington State. The photos do not amount to evidence of deadly weapon use, and cannot be used for sentence enhancement per RCW 9.94A.825 as charged. To do so would necessitate the position that any object held up constitutes a deadly weapon. Was this the Legislature's intent?

State v. Sobrenson 1972  
v. Fowler 1990  
people v. Fisher 1968  
penalty cannot be enhanced if evidence establishes that Def was armed with a 'gunlike' but non-deadly weapon

RCW 9.94.270 Dangerous Weapons (a)

Estate v. Thompson, 1977 "capacity to inflict... part of body" and what were injuries inflicted, to which weapon was applied

The charges in this case include a reference to RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c) "Assaults another with a deadly weapon." This is an interesting and probably vague subsection of the statute. If we are to understand it, we must look at the legal and perhaps the general definitions of "Assault." RCW 9A.36.021 states: "under circumstances NOT AMOUNTING to Assault in the First Degree."

[RCW 9A.36.021 Assault in the First Degree, (a) Assaults another with a deadly weapon with Intent, ... and (c) Assaults another and thereby inflicts great bodily harm.]

Since these were NOT charged we must find that the charges <sup>in this case</sup> do NOT AMOUNT to Assault in the First Degree. Going back to RCW 9A.36.021 we read:

"(a) Intentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm; also NOT charged. So we find that the charges do not amount to "Assault" under these subsections.

Looking at other definitions of Assault we find legal definitions and common definitions to include the following idea: "the threat or use of force on another that causes that person to have a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact." -- Ballentine's

Here two points: Wa Case Law [State v Brakes, 1970] tells us that Washington state law, before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1986, did NOT consider apprehension to be part of the Assault charge. Second point: if Plaintiff felt so threatened, why did he lung at Defendant; and why was Defendant's claim of a need for self defense not amounting to the same sort of apprehension.

was added by wa legislative?

[State v Brakes, 1970] -> but "Intent" is not an element of Assault



1957 acts  
resulting from  
the washing  
of the washing  
machine  
to advance  
while

(2) "Defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was impaired," Again, I think that is not the issue. The event happened very quickly and there was no time for any thinking. There was <sup>no</sup> ~~never~~ ~~any~~ conscious thought to react in self defense to Plaintiff's lunging. It was pure reflex to bring my hands in defense of my mid section. <sup>Defendant's</sup> My body reflexively defended itself to lunging at my neck. If anything, <sup>P's</sup> loss of equilibrium after falling <sup>might have</sup> contributed to <sup>D's</sup> difficulty standing <sup>while</sup> but this is NOT having to do with my capacity for thinking about fact. It was clear to me that Plaintiff was behaving aggressively.

Further, the Forensic Mental Health Report cited <sup>by</sup> made no mention of Defendant's disability (note: Defendant has never seen that report.) Defendant's Hereditary Hemochromatosis (Iron overload) affects the brain in several ways having to do with endocrine and neurotransmitter functions. It <sup>occasionally</sup> causes <sup>Defendant</sup> me to fall <sup>over</sup> uncontrollably and hit my head causing brain trauma (concussions).

Defendant did inform Larry Jefferson that the Western State Personell were not, by their own admissions, qualified to report on the <sup>defendant's</sup> condition. Defendant was not allowed to review the report. Further, L. Jefferson declined to challenge the report despite Defendant's explicit request.


The Prosecution

Thus Mr Tunieich's comment that said Report "establishes no mental disease or defect" is either a misunderstanding or a creative interpolation of the facts. Defendant was and continues to be disabled by his iron overload in both mental and physical ways. His pain makes physical activity difficult. And his mental dysfunction <sup>makes</sup> ~~completes~~ <sup>is absolutely necessary to</sup>

At sentencing, Judge Price focused on the "wrongfulness" issue rather than the incapacitation of the Defendant with regard to Defendant's inability to Assault someone. How does an arthritic disabled old man raise fear in a neighbor?

Mr. Doyle, can you please send me copies of the mental Health Report, the Jury instructions and the "statements" from the night of the arrest? I would appreciate being able to further review these issues in the context of the legal library West's law here at WSP.

Respectfully



Joseph Donnette - Sherman DOC No. 383022  
WASHINGTON STATE PENITENTIARY WA 226  
1313 N 13th AVE  
Walla Walla WA 99362

comment after

to be absolutely necessary



Thomas Doyle, Attorney at Law pg 1 12/4/15 8am  
PO Box 510, Hansville WA 98340-0510 (360) 626 0148

will I need a 2255 motion?  
Prejudicial  
was  
at trial  
used  
(2011)  
Beadle v Beadle

Thomas Doyle, please let me know about the status of my Appeal No. 47602-9-II. I have been reading up on the laws and cases that seem pertinent and find that my case has problems, some of which have to do with transcripts, Jury Instructions, and Arrest Reports which I don't have. My memory of the trial is weak and I wonder why my Attorney Larry Jefferson of Thurston Office of Assigned Counsel (LJ) did not present to the Jury any of the information I had sent to him both in writing and in person. (LJ) is NOT responding to my inquiries and perhaps you could contact him. If you need my permission to access his case notes, I hereby authorize it.

The issues of law I see are having to do with Intent, the level of interaction [RCW 9A.04.100(1)(2) and Rule 3.8], and the alleged "deadly weapon". How did the prosecution prove the dull "weapon" (AFA, my yard tool) was deadly. How did they admit it past the hearsay rule without proving it was accurate? [State v ~~Bar~~ [LJ] [LJ] Bashaw (2009, 2010)] Since they knew it was the best for the sentencing enhancement it had to accurately portray it as the one used at the Alleged incident. How did they prove beyond Reasonable doubt that it was used in <sup>such</sup> a manner? Why was

there NO forensic Evidence submitted? Why were my requested experts on Weapon use, brain injury (etc), and video tape Analysis not presented by (LJ)?

The Plaintiff lunged at Defendant with a black object in his outstretched hands thus closing the distance Range of the Defendant, who had his hands up in one photo, and still in the next photo which was blurred by the motion of Plaintiff.

Why was Plaintiff's supposed injury not shown to be non-deadly even if it was a result of the incident, which was NOT apparent at the time of the alleged assault? Why didn't (LJ) raise the issue of the absence of malice? Why wasn't Defendant's reputation for peaceful law abidance presented to the Jury?

Prior to trial the Prosecution had altered several "plea" deals that dropped the deadly weapon and changed the charges to something less than Assault 2. Why would they do that if those could be proven? Brandishing a weapon (if that is what it was rather than a balance gesture) is only a misdemeanor.

How was Intent proved? the Defendant is disabled and was suffering/recovering from prior head trauma. How could Defendant be found guilty of contradicting verdicts? one verdict contends that

State v Eckerode (Wash 2007)  
State v Featherman (2000)  
Petition of Gonder (1189)  
State v Fowler

Fed Rule 3531.4 Injury in Fed.  
was not Deadly Use  
injury testified  
when stimulating  
emotional  
5/15  
Predictive  
excessive  
Fed

see Superior Court of WA Thurston Co.  
felony judgement and sentence  
dated 5/19/2015

Defendant was "intentionally cutting another person, and tending but ~~fail~~ failing to accomplish it." Next, Defendant "created a reasonable apprehension of imminent fear of bodily injury" even though NOT intended. And why did Plaintiff even approach Defendant if he was in fear? In [State v McKague (2011 #11, a ruling that an injury "necessarily requires a showing greater than injury merely having some existence." Per Sentence Enhancement penalty cannot be enhanced if evidence establishes that defendant was armed with a 'weapon-like' but NOT deadly weapon." Further, because Alleged weapon is in the category of "other weapon" (other than Firearm), it must be shown to be readily capable of bodily harm ~~to~~ (ie: Victim <sup>must</sup> be in range and Assailant strong enough) also sharp enough

How did the Prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it wasn't Defendant's right to self defense? [State v Pam (1983)] [State v Lynn Alexander TAKACS] [RCW 9A.16.020 (3) (2) burden of proof is on Prosecution] - ~~see~~ Plaintiff's Front entry walkway is not his abode [RCW 9A.1.270].

Per RCW 10.31.100 since the Deputy had probable cause for Plaintiff's action as a significant initiator why wasn't plaintiff arrested on the night of the incident?


o/n

[Per RCW 9A.41(2)(a)] "if sufficient evidence exists (Plaintiff's lunging photo and report by Defendant) which when considered with the most plausible (self Defense), reasonably foreseeable defense that could be raised under the evidence would justify a conviction by a reasonable and objective fact finder."

Surely if Defendant was arrestable based on Plaintiff's statement, then Plaintiff's statements should be equal to Defendant's and Plaintiff should be arrestable too.

Do I need a 2255 motion for an Evidentiary Hearing to review Ineffective Assistance of Counsel? What would be my best case with regard to (LJ's) refusals to present the issues I raised prior to trial? When should I file a Statement of Additional Grounds (SAG) and what is RAP 10.10?

Sincerely



Joseph Donnette-Sherman DOC. No. 383022

WASHINGTON STATE PENITENTIARY WILLIAMS Unit A 226

1313 N 13th Ave

Walla Walla WA 99362

PS: what exactly is "the evidence" in this case, and how was it corroborated?

PSS: See also Attachment to no. 13-1-01173-9 (TCSC) already in your possession dated July 12, 2015 4 OVER

MOTION FOR RELIEF OF JUDGEMENT or order, CrR Rule 7.8

Thurston County Superior Court # 13-1-01173-9 8/6/15  
Motion for Collateral Attack - originally submitted in MAY 2015  
(and NOT responded to)

Wherein during Trial, false evidence was presented  
to the Jury by the Prosecutor.

A comparison of the photos from the night of the arrest  
(± Aug 4th 2013), as photographed by the Arresting Deputy,  
Do NOT MATCH the weapon used as evidence by the  
Prosecutor of the Jury Trial.

The photos from the night of the arrest were provided to  
Defendant as requested for Defense's Discovery on or  
about September, 2013. The same photos were delivered  
to D.A.'s Defense Attorney LARRY JEFFERSON and  
reviewed at his office with Defendant. Neither DNA or  
fingerprints from the alleged weapon used at trial  
could possibly be tied to Defendant. The Jury was  
improperly influenced by false evidence. The Machete  
presented at Trial looks more weapon-like than  
Defendant's yard tool which is not sharp, this is critical.  
slight weight

In Addition:

(1) A videotape purported to be from Bruce A. Bolyes'  
(plaintiff) security camera (though not used at  
trial) was doctored and falsified. This is demonstrated  
by comparing the false video to photos taken by  
Plaintiff on the night of the alleged incident.

[see: Defendant's foot positions, shadow inconsistencies,  
and orientation of camera.] The video's falsification  
illustrates a deliberate intent to falsify evidence to  
be used in the case. The falsified video had been  
separated by the Defense and reviewed at Defense  
Attorney's office only several weeks before Trial.  
The false video was not taken into evidence the  
night of the alleged incident and only came to light  
months later.

Unless Plaintiff's  
"most recent possession" is  
proven to be  
genuine  
supporting to falsify

(2.) The "arms held upward" photograph suggested to be a menacing gesture was actually Defendant's attempt to maintain balance while tripping over the concrete step. Defendant's foot positions are NOT the same as depicted in the false video.

(3.) The close up of Defendant's midsection is blurred due to the erratic motion of the camera as Plaintiff lunged at Defendant. The location of the camera is inconsistent with that portrayed in the fake video. At the moment of the photograph, there is NO CONTACT from Defendant, Defendant felt threatened by Plaintiff's aggression and tone of voice.

(4.) The orientation of the phone/camera in the false video is inconsistent with the photograph. Plaintiff held the camera with the lens pointed at Defendant, NOT with phone/camera buttons facing forward.

(5.) Plaintiff's eager photography illustrates that he was NOT intimidated or afraid of the yard tool being used as a weapon. The Prosecution's contention that Defendant's yard tool is a "deadly weapon" is NOT tenable given its NON-use to inflict bodily harm. The arresting Deputy testified only to the apparently intact evidence wrapping, NOT that the weapon used as evidence was used during the alleged incident. Evidence based on hearsay is inadmissible under Rules of Evidence #2. A Deadly Weapon enhancement to a sentence must be a fact in the incident, NOT hearsay. Prosecution must prove that it is capable of producing bodily harm (see: State v. Pam 98 Wash.2d 748, 753, 659 P.2d 454 (1983) and: State v. Todd J Carlson (April 2 1992) [5] and: State v. Workman 90 Wash.2d 443, 454, 584 P.2d 382 (1978))

July 12, 2015

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ATTACHMENT to MOTION AND ORDER FOR APPEAL BOND  
Thurston County Superior Court (TCSC) No: 13-1-01173-9

Joseph M. Donnell-Sherman (JDS) was convicted by a Thurston County Superior Court Jury Trial of Assault 2 with a "deadly weapon" on ± April 23, 2015. At sentencing JDS was denied an Appeal Bail Bond. JDS had been out on his own recognizance for about 18 months while waiting for Trial. JDS demonstrated responsibility and no risk for flight or violence. He made all required Court Dates, coordinated effectively with Bail Bondsmen regarding weekly check-ins and travel restrictions. JDS had NO contact with Plaintiff per the Restraining Order. There have been NO violations.

JDS is a respectable, peaceful, and Disabled citizen who has rescued people and equipment on multiple occasions. His work as an architect Sole Practitioner has made him responsible for Public Safety, which he has never failed to provide. JDS does NOT own, or know how to use, weapons of any kind. (RCWA 9A.36.02) [c]

JDS (Defendant)'s conviction is based entirely on the false statements of Plaintiff (one person's word against another's), and Jurisdictional failures which are under Appeal. The Plaintiff's statements are unsubstantiated and Defendant's were ignored. JDS contends that the Plaintiff's actions precipitated the accidental collision that is the basis for the charges in this case. (RCWA 9.94A.535 (1)(a)(c)(e))

July 12, 2015

pg 2 of 6  
TCSC 13-1-01173-9

This can be demonstrated by a fair examination of the evidence. (see Plaintiff's and Defendant's statements and photos from the night of the arrest. Note: statements and photos could not be obtained from Court Documents at this time.)

JDS asks for a minimum, or zero Bail Bond based on previous Bail behavior and his indigency. The only money available to him is his monthly Disability payments for living expenses and his Home's value, which is subject to foreclosure in July 2015. JDS's credit cards are maxed out. All he might do is borrow more money from family.

JDS is Disabled per the ruling of a Federal Judge and has not been able to work for several years. He has both physical and mental limitations to his abilities. His health is affected by disruptions of his nervous, muscular and endocrine systems -- the effects of Hereditary Hemochromatosis (Iron Overload) on the human metabolic systems. Essentially JDS loses his ability to concentrate effectively and follow the meanings of discourse. Physical activity aggravates his condition. His Court Appointed Defense Attorney did not understand this and did not present it effectively to the Jury at Trial. The Court sponsored Evaluations of his competency did NOT adequately address his Disabilities. These inefficiencies harmed JDS's rights for equal protection, both at Trial and at sentencing.



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pg 3 of 6  
TCC 13-1-01173-9

The ineffectiveness of Defendant's Defense Attorney (LARRY JEFFERSON) will be presented at the Appeal Hearing or Discretionary Review. Issues of ineffective Counsel includes:

- (1) Important events at the time of the alleged assault, and as presented in Defendant's statements, were NOT presented to the Jury at Trial.

- (2) Thurston County Deputies arrived late on the scene and relied on Plaintiff's statements only as the basis for the Arrest of the Defendant. There were no witnesses to the alleged event aside from Plaintiff's security camera and photos which were NOT presented at Trial.

- (3) Defendant's history of being an excellent citizen with NO crime record was NOT presented to Jury. The Court Appointed Defense Attorney declined to subpoena or depose Defendant's requested character witnesses.

- (4) Defendant's request for Experts to testify regarding the appearances of weapons uses, Chronic Traumatic Encephalitis (CTE), and video tape falsification were not honored.

- (5) At the time of the alleged assault, the Defendant had NO ill will toward the Plaintiff (his next door neighbor), and was surprized and shocked by Plaintiff's aggression.

Apparently, we live in a County where your neighbor can say he is "Afraid" of you because of a dull yard tool. And the local constabulatory will send you to prison without Bail terms.

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pg 4 of 6  
Case 13-1-01173-9

The yard tool in question, (AKA alleged "deadly weapon") was NOT sharp, and was present at the alleged event only because it was being used to clear blackberry vines in Defendant's yard. It was there by coincidence, NOT an intent to intimidate Plaintiff. Indeed, Defendant didn't even know Plaintiff was present at the time. Defendant was responding to the dog's yelping as though injured. On inspection JPS determined that the dog's wire tether had become snagged under the corner of the concrete walkway, thus preventing it from returning to the Plaintiff's front porch. Defendant's good samaritan act of breaking the wire free ultimately resulted in Defendant falling on Plaintiff's front entry steps, when the tug of the dog pulled him over. Defendant aggravated his prior head trauma (CTE) and subsequently struggled to stand; He threw his arms up and out to balance himself after tripping. At this point Plaintiff apparently photographed Defendant and the photo became evidence of "brandishing" the yard tool.

Subsequently, Plaintiff lunged at Defendant as illustrated by a second photo, blurred by the erratic motion of the camera, 3 feet off the ground and 3 feet away, and pointed at Defendant's navel. Defendant can be made out to be standing with arms up and NOT touching Plaintiff. In other words it was Plaintiff that initiated by approaching Defendant in an aggressive manner.

July 12, 2015

pg 5 of 6  
72SC13-1-01173-9

manner. There was no apparent wounding of the Plaintiff at the time of the incident and none demonstrated in Court. Plaintiff's bruised knuckle could have happened later and, according to Defendant's experts, was self inflicted.

The Defendant is old and Disabled. The pain in his muscles and joints practically prevents him from walking, let alone assaulting anyone.

The machete presented at trial does not belong to the Defendant. It looks much more "weapon-like" than Defendant's smaller yard tool. The arresting Deputy testified only that the "evidence seal" appeared undisturbed, NOT that it was used as a weapon by Defendant.

The video tape from Plaintiff's security camera would have shown Defendant's fall and unstable standing, as well as Plaintiff's actions. The tape was NOT taken as evidence and was supposedly delivered months later. It was purportedly non-functional. Only after it was opened by the Defendant's consultant did a falsified video arrive at the Defense Attorney's office 2 weeks before Trial. Though it was NOT used at trial, if it had been shown to be falsified it could have been put to "NOT insignificant use" (WILDE V. STATE 706 P2d 251 (Wyo 1985)) by the Defense. A false video would have shown that someone was trying to submit false evidence.

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In conclusion, JDS deserves to be released on Bail. There are extenuating circumstances surrounding his conviction that must be investigated and documented. JDS needs the freedom to follow up on these issues personally as he is no longer able to afford expert representation and coordinate effectively from Prison.

J. D. Sullivan

Joseph Donnette-Sierman #383022

WASHINGTON STATE PENITENTIARY

P.O. Box 10000

Spokane, WA 99209

WILLIAM UNIT A-130-L

1313 NORTH 13th

Walla Walla, WA 98362

# SAG outline

today a page

DW under RCW is defined in general not totally consistent ways. See 9A.04A.025; 9A.041.010(6); 9A.041.040(2) of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW); 9A.041.270; 9A.04A.533(4) then there is the dictionary versions. Then there is case law. 😊 My favorite is where machete is defined as "Drug paraphernalia" in a drug bust where defendant was harvesting weed, not said.

## SAG

P's statements

Pros. did not verify with corroborating evidence.

LT didn't either, did not challenge on cross false machete wasn't forensically tested for evidence false arrest after SD indicated P not arrested based on lunging and restraining DEF puts DEF in legal jeopardy. LT did not seek true analysis of photos (also false video)

P's statements were false and internally inconsistent with his statements.

(DB) Dep Brict's memory is missing VRP 05/15 8/14/13 - 4/23/13 8/4/13 DEF statement of facts per inconsistent false testimony that was not corroborated and not challenged by LT

cell phone not seized, DB already slipping from DEF

claim for photos & video \$100/day. Motion to compel discovery and award fees Arrest reports

P "don't remember" 24/22 answered wrong question reveals coaching "cable of the dog in hand" 9/24 & 9/28 "dog ran"

The evidence is only P's statements (corroborating)

false machete and video, photos

False Arrest based on P's statements alone despite SD claim Held incommunicado - no evidence taken re phone/video

20. cumulative error doctrine

1. Ambiguities in charging doc. Vacate, Compel Discovery
2. false arrest & held incomm.
3. JI lack of lunging, photo analysis; not abuse, injury.
4. corrob. etc. cell phone searched & restraint.
5. 18 months & lesser memory
6. Dep Brict 2/last "cut his leash" NOT meant "free his leash from snag"